Big Data: Issues for an International Political Sociology of Data Practices by Madsen, A.K. et al.
1		
	
Big data: Issues for an international political sociology of the 
datafication of worlds1 Madsen,	A.K,	Flyverbom,	M.,	Hilbert,	M.	and	Ruppert,	E.		In	International	Political	Sociology	(forthcoming	2016)			
Abstract	The	claim	that	big	data	can	revolutionize	strategy	and	governance	in	the	context	of	international	relations	is	increasingly	hard	to	ignore.	Scholars	of	international	political	sociology	have	mainly	discussed	this	development	through	the	themes	of	security	and	surveillance.	The	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	outline	a	research	agenda	that	can	be	used	to	raise	a	broader	set	of	sociological	and	practice-oriented	questions	about	the	increasing	datafication	of	international	relations	and	politics.	First,	it	proposes	a	way	of	conceptualizing	big	data	that	is	broad	enough	to	open	fruitful	investigations	into	the	emerging	use	of	big	data	in	these	contexts.	This	conceptualization	includes	the	identification	of	three	moments	contained	in	any	big	data	practice.	Secondly,	it	suggests	a	research	agenda	built	around	a	set	of	sub-themes	that	each	deserve	dedicated	scrutiny	when	studying	the	interplay	between	big	data	and	international	relations	along	these	moments.	Through	a	combination	of	these	moments	and	sub-themes,	the	paper	suggests	a	roadmap	for	an	international	political	sociology	of	the	datafication	of	worlds.			
INTRODUCTION	The	world's	technological	capacity	to	store	information	grew	from	2.6	(optimally	compressed)	exabytes	in	1986,	over	55	in	2000,	to	300	in	2007	(Hilbert	and	Lopez,	2011).	Extrapolating	these	tendencies	with	complementary	sources	(e.g.	Gantz	and	Reinsel,	2012;	Turner	et	al.,	2014),	we	estimate	them	to	have	reached	5,000	exabytes	by	2014	(or	5	optimally	compressed	zettabytes).	This	is	equivalent	to	some	4,500	piles	of	double	printed	books	of	125	pages	from	planet	Earth	to	the	sun.	The	world’s	technological	capacity	to	compute	information	has	grown	even	2-3	times	faster	than	our	capacity	to	store	information	(Hilbert,	2014a).	Our	computers	are	so	powerful	that	if	all	2.5	million	students	of	the	United	Kingdom	were	to	calculate	from	the	big	bang	until	now	(without	break),	they	could	merely	execute	half	as	many	basic	calculations	as	computers	can	execute	in	only	one	second	(Hilbert,	2014b).	This	situation	provides	both	massive	input	(storage	of	events)	and	powerful	computational	tools	(analysis	of	events)	to	derive	intelligence	for	informed	decision	making,	ranging	from	the	everyday	conduct	of	ordinary	citizens	to	transnational	governance.	In	our	daily	lives,	most	of	us	are	already	experiencing	how	digital	traces	and	algorithms	shape	how	we	think	and	act.	Results	from	Google	searches	decide	what	we	see	and	do	not	see	(Madsen,	2016),	Facebook	aims	to	control	our	mood	by	tweaking	the	content	that	shows	up	in	our	daily	feed	(Booth,	2014),	and	the	prices	we	are	offered	in	online	shops	depend	on	our	location,	device	and	most	recent	online	activities	(Hannak	et	al.																																																									1	Accepted	Manuscript	version	March	2016.	
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2013;	Hannak	et	al.	2014).	Looking	beyond	such	everyday	situations,	it	is	evident	that	data	and	algorithmic	operations	are	increasingly	important	in	relation	to	political	practices	such	as	urban	governance	(Kitchin,	2014),	anti-corruption	(Hansen	&	Flyverbom,	2014),	international	mobility	(Mocanu	et	al.	2013),	and	international	development	(Hilbert,	2013).		In	short,	big	data	is	increasingly	used	to	monitor,	know,	and	govern	populations.	For	this	purpose	analysts	have	typically	utilized	one	of	three	sources	of	data.	First,	cell	
phone	logs	have	been	used	to	track	real-time	movements	of	humans,	such	as	patterns	of	migration	in	Rwanda	(Blumenstock	2012).	Secondly,	internet	searches	have	been	used	to	predict	peoples	wellbeing.	For	instance,	Google	searches	have	been	used	to	predict	dengue	infections	in	Singapore	and	Thailand	(Althouse	and	Ng,	2011).	Thirdly,	traces	on	various	types	of	social	media	platforms	have	been	used	to	track	humans	and	predict	their	behavior.	Geo-tagged	pictures	of	Flickr	have,	for	instance,	been	used	to	monitor	human	movements	in	situations	of	disease	outbreaks	(De	Choudhury	et	al.,	2010)	and	the	sentiment	of	tweets	have	been	used	to	predict	economic	crises	(Global	Pulse,	2011).		What	to	make	of	such	big	data	practices?	How	to	understand	sociologically	and	politically	their	significance?	An	initial	look	at	how	the	field	of	international	political	sociology	(IPS)	has	treated	this	topic	suggests	that	the	interesting	questions	concern	privacy,	surveillance	and	security	(Stevens	2015;	Bauman	et	al.	2014	and	Amoore	2014).	More	particularly,	it	seems	that	the	Snowden	leaks	and	the	PRISM	programme	have	been	the	most	important	important	points	of	reference	when	theorizing	big	data. The	literature	has	to	a	large	extent	focused	on	how	intelligence	agencies	and	the	state	are	beginning	to	reassert	sovereign	power	over	new	types	of	data	and	how	they	use	this	power	to	profile	people	as	well	as	trace	potential	terrorists.	This	frames	data-driven	practices	of	governance	as	being	of	theoretical	interest	because	they	raise	questions	about,	for	instance,	the	power-relation	between	IT	and	telecompanies	and	the	state.		While	acknowledging	the	importance	of	this	line	of	work,	we	want	to	argue	that	big	data	raises	questions	for	IPS	that	go	far	beyond	this	focus	on	surveillance	and	security.	We	want	to	introduce	a	set	of	questions	and	focal	points	that	make	it	possible	for	IPS	to	engage	with	big	data	as	a	wider	political	and	social	phenomenon.	As	a	supplement	to	the	issues	already	discussed	in	the	literature,	we	suggest	a	need	to	focus	on	issues	such	as	the	formation	of	political	subjectivities,	the	valuation	of	data	and	the	epistemological	and	organizational	turmoils	accompanying	new	data	practices.		The	paper	will	take	two	steps	in	supporting	a	research	agenda	along	these	lines.	First,	Part	I	will	propose	a	way	of	defining	big	data	that	unpacks	it	as	a	heterogenous	phenomenon.	For	that	purpose,	it	introduces	‘three	moments’	of	big	data	practices.	The	first	concerns	the	datafication	of	daily	life,	the	second	concerns	the	production	of	patterns	and	predictions	and	the	third	concerns	the	making	of	new	modes	of	governance.	Thinking	along	these	moments	lays	a	foundation	for	asking	a	broad	set	of	questions	about	data-driven,	algorithmic	forms	of	governance.		Secondly,	Part	II	will	use	the	suggested	definition	as	a	stepping-stone	for	deeper	discussions	of	four	sub-themes	that	we	believe	to	be	especially	worthy	of	scholarly	investigation.	In	sub-theme	1,	Mikkel	Flyverbom	ponders	the	changed	modes	of	conduct	in	an	emerging	datafication-governance	nexus.	In	sub-theme	2,	Evelyn	Ruppert	argues	for	the	relevance	of	inquiring	deeper	into	the	political	subjectivities	of	big	data	practices.	In	sub-theme	3,	Anders	Koed	Madsen	focuses	on	the	dynamics	of	data	
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valuation	involved	in	big	data	practices	and	Martin	Hilbert	ends	the	paper	with	reflections	on	the	limits	of	big	data	and	the	importance	of	theory	in	knowledge	production	in	sub-theme	4.		When	combined,	we	believe	that	these	moments	and	sub-themes	can	lay	the	foundation	for	a	roadmap	for	future	research	on	big	data	within	the	field	of	international	political	sociology.	We	have	summaried	some	of	the	most	important	elements	in	this	road	map	in	the	table	below.	It	suggests	relevant	questions	to	ask	in	relation	to	each	moment	and	it	lists	references	to	the	most	central	works	in	the	theoretical	lineage	that	have	motivated	these	questions.	Finally,	it	lists	cases	in	the	context	of	big	data	and	governance	where	this	specific	combination	of	research	questions	and	theory	has	proved	to	be	especially	relevant.	The	rest	of	this	paper	will	provide	the	background	of	the	suggested	roadmap.				
	 Sub-questions	broken	into	moments	
(w/	central	concepts	highlighted)	
	
					Moment	1																		Moment	2											Moment	3	
Theoretical	
lineage	
Illustrative	cases	
Sub-theme	1:	
How	is	
conduct	
shaped	in	the	
datafication-
governance	
nexus?	
	
Through	which	
material	
infrastructures	are	data	sources	produced	and	shaped?		
Which	
patterns	of	
inclusion	and	exclusion	are	at	play	when	data	is	made	‘algorithm-ready’?		
To	what	extent	does	new	data	come	with	
calculative	
rationalities	that	unsettles	established	ways	of	doing	governance?		What	is	the	relation	between	
algorithmic	
transparency	and	control	in	datafied	governance?		
Governmentality	literature:		Foucault	(1983)	Miller	&	Rose	(1990)	Dean	(1999)	Scott	(1998)				
Profiling	of	terrorists		Google	Flu	Trends	
Sub-theme	2:		
	
Who	are	the	
political	
subjects	of	
Big	Data?		
	
How	do	platforms	configure	
everyday	
conduct	but	at	the	same	time	create	possibilities	for	digital	citizens	to	act?				
How	do	algorithms	ignore	the	myriad	acts	of	subjects	who	do	not	simply	obey	or	submit	but	subvert	their	workings?		
How	do	subjects	make	
rights	claims	and	become	
digital	
citizens	in	and	by	not	only	what	they	do	through	the	Internet	but	what	they	say?		
Power	and	subjectivity:		Foucault	(1983)	Balibar	(1991)	Austin(1962)	Franklin	(2013)		
Acts	of	Snowden	and	Manning			Daily	acts	of	blocking	and	filtering,	encrypting	communications,	creating	multiple	and	anonymised	and	shared	identities,	
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If	what	subjects	are	saying	and	doing	through	the	Internet	is	changing	
political	
subjectivity	then	what	does	this	mean	for	the	data	that	is	generated?		
deploying	bots,	gaming	trending	algorithms,	etc.	
Sub-theme	3:		
How	are	
dynamics	of	
valuation	
influencing	
Big	Data	
projects?		
	
How	is	the	
exchange	
value	of	data	established	when	organizations	and	companies	form	partnerships?			
	 How	is	the	
epistemic	
value	of	new	data	settled	in	organizations	that	are	in	the	process	of	changing	practices	of	decision-making?			
Valuation	Theory:			Muniesa	et	al.	(2007)		Espeland	&	Stevens	(1998)		Stark	(2011)		
Copenhagen	City	Data	Market 	UN	Global	Pulse	
Sub-theme	4:		
	
How	is	theory	
and	history	
imposing	
limits	on	the	
power	of	Big	
Data?	
	
Is	it	useful	and	possible	to	create	big	data	beyond	the	empirical	digital	footprint	of	big	data?	Which	kind?				
Which	types	of	big	data	projects	assume	stationarity	and	therefore	are	deceptive	or	limit	political	flexibility	for	future	change?		
How	should	traditional	(empiricial)	big	data	analysis	be	combined	with	theoretical	envisioning	of	changing	histories	to	be	politically	relevant	for	new	modes	of	governance?	
Critiques	of	econometrics:		Lucas	(1976)	Goodhart	(1976)	Campbell	(1976)		
UN	Environment	programme		City	of	Portland	simulation	
Table	1:	A	roadmap	for	future	research	on	big	data	in	international	political	sociology		
Part	I:	Big	data,	a	heterogeneous	phenomenon.	Big	data	is	a	phenomenon	that	has	been	defined	and	conceptualized	in	various	ways	during	the	last	five	years	(De	Mauro	et	al.	2014).	There	is	no	consensus	about	what	demarcates	big	data	from	other	types	of	data,	but	a	widely	used	definition	has	been	Douglas	Laney’s	‘3	v’s’:	Big	data	is	high	volume,	high	velocity,	and/or	high	variety	information	assets	that	require	new	forms	of	processing	to	enable	enhanced	decision	making,	insight	discovery	and	process	optimization	(Laney,	2012)	According	to	Laney’s	definition,	big	data	practices	are	characterized	by	the	technical	attributes	of	the	data	they	involve.	Data-points	are	numerous	and	they	come	from	
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various	sources	in	a	pace	that	is	sometimes	referred	to	as	real-time.	This	definition	also	entails	that	the	problems	raised	by	big	data	practices	have	technical	solutions.	For	Laney,	the	pressing	question	is	to	find	the	right	processing	techniques	to	handle	data	with	these	new	characteristics.		Writers	such	as	Victor	Meyer-Schönberger	and	Kenneth	Cukier	have	challenged	these	largely	technical	definitions.	Instead	of	focusing	on	the	nature	of	data,	they	define	big	data	with	a	focus	on	the	new	dynamics	of	knowledge	production	and	valuation	that	are	changed	with	the	introduction	of	new	data	practices:		Big	Data	refers	to	things	one	can	do	at	a	large	scale	that	cannot	be	done	at	a	smaller	one,	to	extract	new	insights	or	create	new	forms	of	value,	in	ways	that	change	markets,	organizations,	the	relationship	between	citizens	and	governments	and	more	(Mayer-Schönberger	&	Cukier	2013)	In	line	with	our	introductory	comments	above,	we	agree	that	the	role	of	big	data	in	transnational	governance	is	not	a	purely	technical	phenomenon.	It	must	be	approached	as	a	heterogeneous	phenomenon	that	can	be	studied	by	attending	to	the	interplay	between	social	and	technical	relations	in	the	way	suggested	by	Meyer-Schönberger	and	Cukier.	However,	we	want	to	add	that	this	interplay	can	be	fruitfully	studied	by	attending	to	the	following	three	moments	of	big	data	practices,	1)	The	datafication	of	daily	life,	2)	the	production	of	patterns	and	predictions	and	3)	the	making	of	new	modes	of	governance.		
1st	moment:	The	datafication	of	daily	life	A	condition	for	any	data	practice	is	the	existence	of	a	dataset	to	be	analysed.	Data	need	to	be	produced	in	one	way	or	another.	The	production	of	big	data	varies	from	more	traditional	data	practices	in	the	sense	that	it	is	tightly	connected	to	the way people act. 
Surveys, focus groups and other traditional data-collection methods deliberately 
construct a specific situation in which relevant data is produced. This is not the case 
with big data where the data sources are telephone logs, web searches and social 
media feeds.  It	is	essentially	a	digital	footprint	almost	inevitabley	left	behind	by	every	digital	step	taken.	The	same	as	with	footprints,	these	datapoints	are	produced	as	byproducts	and	rapidly	increase	with	the	increased	datafication	of	people’s	daily	lives.	This	raises	questions	about	the	way	interplays	between	social	and	technical	relations	at	the	moment	of	production	come	to	set	the	direction	for	big	data	practices.		Table	1	suggests	a	list	of	questions	that	we	believe	to	be	important	for	IPS	in	this	regard.	These	questions	illustrate	the	need	to	look	at	the	interrelation	between	platforms,	practices	and	data	when	conducting	inquiries	into	the	first	moment	of	big	data	practices.	More	specifically,	they	indicate	that	a	central	analytical	challenge	is	to	formulate	an	alternative	to	the	popular	conceptualization	of	data	as	a	raw	product	with	an	intrinsic	value.	Data	is	always	produced	through	the	infrastructures	and	acts	that	shape	it,	and	its	further	analytical	use	is	often	conditioned	by	the	value	ascribed	to	it	by	its	owners.			
2nd	moment:	The	algorithmic	production	of	patterns	and	predictions	The	second	moment	concerns	this	further	analytic	use	in	the	sense	that	it	involves	the	production	of	patterns	and	predictions	on	the	basis	of	available	data.	In	relation	to	transnational	governance	this	could	for	instance	be	the	work	of	showing	that	specific	
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Google	searches	correlate	with	flu	outbreaks	and	translating	this	pattern	into	a	predictive	model	for	flu	detection	(Ginsberg	et	al	2009).	The	basic	idea	always	is	that	some	pattern	in	the	digital	footprint	relates	to	something	interesting	of	the	real	world,	which	therefore	can	be	understood,	traced	and	predicted	through	the	digital	pattern.		This	strategy	of	producing	patterns	and	predictions	through	correlations	is	central	to	the	second	moment	of	big	data	practices.	We	want	to	argue	that	it	raises	important	questions	about	the	role	of	big	data	algorithms	in	knowledge-production.	Big	data	algorithms	are	here	undertood	as	generalized	procedures	for	turning	dis-organized	data-inputs	into	manageable	outputs	through	series	of	logical	rules	(Flyverbom	and	Madsen,	2015).	The	strategy	of	quickly	finding	correlations	in	big	data	sets	entails	that	such	procedures	become	increasingly	central	to	developments	in	governance	and	politics.	They	begin	to	shape	what	we	aspire	to	and	seek	solutions	to	in	societies.		Some	applaud	this	and	focus	on	the	potentials	for	more	timely,	precise	and	rational	forms	of	governance	(O’Reilly,	2013),	while	others	fear	that	trusting	blindly	in	data	and	technological	fixes	will	mean	the	‘death	of	politics’	(Morozov,	2013).	No	matter	what	position	one	takes	on	this	normative	issue,	we	argue	that	big	data	algorithms,	as	defined	here,	must	be	a	central	concern	when	theorizing	the	second	moment	of	big	data	practices.	Table	1	suggests	that	relevant	questions	to	pose	in	relation	to	this	second	moment	could	focus	on	the	connection	between	predictions	and	the	empirically	detected	past	or	the	relation	between	algorithms	and	(the	reconfiguration	of)	politics.		
3rd	moment:	The	making	of	new	modes	of	governance	Studying	big	data	with	a	focus	on	algorithmic	operations	may	be	a	useful	starting	point,	but	it	is	also	limited	in	its	grasp	and	conceptualization	of	the	many	social	and	technical	relations	that	constitute	it.	It	is	insufficient	to	focus	on	the	technical	capacities	and	character	of	the	sources	involved.	The	reason	being	that	big	data	practices	are	not	autonomous,	technological	processes	with	predictable	effects,	or	the	“inevitable	consequence	of	a	technological	juggernaut	with	a	life	of	its	own	entirely	outside	the	social”	(Zuboff,	2015:	75).		We	need	to	leave	deterministic	frameworks	and	reflect	on	the	larger	transformation	that	big	data	is	part	and	parcel	of.	This	includes	understanding	how	the	abovementioned	patterns	and	predictions	begin	to	influence	new	modes	of	governance.	This	is	what	we	refer	to	as	the	third	moment	of	big	data	practices	and	we	suggest	that	this	form	of	influence	is	conditioned	upon	a	certain	combination	of	technological	features,	practical	uses	and	meanings	ascribed	to	data	in	specific	situations	(Madsen,	2013).	Any	successful	attempt	to	conceptualize	the	role	of	big	data	in	transnational	governance	must	ask	questions	about	the	complex,	entangled	nature	of	technological	developments.		In	relation	to	this	third	moment,	Table	1	suggests	a	range	of	relevant	questions	to	ask.	How	is	conduct	is	shaped	in	the	datafication-governance	nexus?	Does	digital	data	blur 
traditional demarcation about what is foreign and what is domestic? Does the call for 
working with varied data sources in big data practices blur the boundaries between 
what is a reserach design choice and what is a commercial design choice? Is there a 
danger that statistical analyses of empirical data, can lead to path-dependency and 
polarization?	
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Part	II:	Four	sub-themes	for	a	future	research	agenda	on	big	data	in	transnational	
politics		Part	I	sketched	the	contours	of	a	research	agenda	that	defines	big	data	as	a	heterogeneous	phenomenon	that	can	be	studied	by	attending	to	the	interplay	between	social	and	technical	relations.	Furthermore,	it	suggested	three	moments	of	big	data	practices	where	this	interplay	can	be	fuitfully	explored,	and	Table	1	indicated	central	questions	to	ask	for	each	of	these	moments.		Our	argument	is	that	an	exploration	of	big	data	along	these	lines	will	help	move	from	treating	this	phenomenon	as	a	technical	question	of	method	into	a	political	sociology	that	interrogates	what	big	data	means	as	a	practice	and	what	is	at	stake	for	international	relations	in	‘the	rise	of	big	data’.	The	second	part	of	this	paper	specifies	the	direction	of	such	a	research	agenda	by	inquiring	into	four	theoretical	sub-themes	that	we	believe	could	be	central	to	a	broader	political	sociological	agenda	for	looking	at	big	data	and	governance.	Each	of	these	sub-themes	are	reflected	in	the	questions	posed	in	table	1.		
Sub-theme	I:		Big	Data,	datafication	and	(post-)politics2	With	the	growing	reliance	on	digital	traces,	we	need	a	critical	focus	on	how	datafication	conditions	particular	forms	of	knowledge,	politics	and	governance.	A	focus	that	takes	us	beyond	both	the	laudatory	accounts	of	big	data	as	‘truths’	or	the	‘end	of	theory’	and	the	more	gloomy	concerns	about	the	automation	of	governance	and	‘algorithmic	regulation’	(Morozov,	2014).	Just	like	earlier	technological	developments	such	as	electrification	and	digitalization	did	not	have	clear-cut	or	unitary	effects,	datafication	will	have	multiple,	conflicting	and	surprising	consequeces	for	social	and	political	formations.	To	grasp	these,	we	need	relatively	open	and	curious	approaches	to	governance	and	datafication.	The	governmentality	literature	(Miller	and	Rose,	1990;	Dean,	1999)	foregrounds	a	specific	set	of	issues	that	help	to	understand	the	workings	of	big	data	in	the	context	of	governance.	Drawing	on	the	work	of	Foucault	(1983),	such	accounts	understand	governance	as	a	complex	set	of	activities,	calculations	and	reasonings	that	shape	conduct.	Thus,	governance	is	not	necessarily	tied	to	the	state	or	formal	power	positions,	but	constituted	through	multiple	practices,	‘governmental	techniques’	and	‘political	rationalities’	(Miller	and	Rose,	1990).	By	engaging	insights	from	sociological	accounts	of	data	and	algorithms,	governmentality	studies	and	related	conceptions	of	governance,	we	can	approach	the	nexus	of	datafication	and	politics	by	focusing	on	the	resources,	knowledge	production	techniques,	temporal	orientations,	and	rationalities	at	work.		Governance	is	knowledge-intensive	work	and	big	data	provides	new	foundations	and	forms	of	efforts	to	steer	the	conduct	of	others.	Whereas	existing	forms	of	knowledge	production	underpinning	governance	rely	on	data	sources	and	calculative	operations	that	can	be	defined,	sorted	and	managed	quite	easily	by	established	procedures,	big	data	analyses	involve	more	messy	and	unstructured	types	of	materials	and	rather	different	operations.	This	requires	new	types	of	skills,	unfamiliar	understandings	of	validity	and	knowledge	and	different	types	of	relations	to	data	producers.	The	intersection	of	big	data	and	governance	deserves	scrutiny	along	the	lines	of	at	least	three	dimensions:	sources	of	knowledge,	calculative	rationalities,	and	temporal																																																									2	Sub-theme	1	was	written	by	Mikkel	Flyverbom	
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orientations,	as	each	of	these	features	of	big	data	have	implications	for	our	understandings	and	the	practical	workings	of	governance.	
Sources	and	knowledge	practices	It	is	a	key	feature	of	big	data	that	the	sources	it	relies	on	have	multiple	origins	and	take	very	different	shapes.	When	inquiring	into	the	first	moment	of	digital	big	data	practices	it,	for	instance,	becomes	evident	that	digital	traces	are	produced	by	a	wide	range	of	objects,	activities	and	platforms.	This	means	that	they	come	with	very	different	information	attached	–	there	are	big	differences	between	GPS	signals,	tweets	and	social	media	scrapings.		Such	questions	about	data	variety	are	discussed	in	existing	accounts,	but	the	primary	focus	is	often	on	the	nature	of	data	sources,	not	the	contexts	and	material	infrastructures	that	they	are	produced	or	shaped	by.	Platforms	such	as	Twitter	produce	very	particular	kinds	of	data	and	meta-data,	such	as	length	of	messages	(maximum	140	characters),	the	location	of	the	author	and	the	language	used.	But	accessing	such	data	is	only	possible	through	the	so-called	Application	Program	Interfaces	(APIs)	set	up	by	data	holders,	and	it	is	rarely	possible	to	know	what	part	of	the	data	these	actually	give	access	to.	Such	factors	complicate	both	the	idea	that	big	data	analyses	tap	into	the	‘total	information’	available	about	a	given	topic	and	the	promise	that	they	can	‘speak	for	themselves’	and	give	us	the	full	picture.		Furthermore,	we	tend	to	forget	that	before	we	start	to	analyze	big	data,	algorithms	and	databases	need	to	be	connected,	and	that	there	are	important	patterns	of	inclusion	and	exclusion	involved.	As	Gillespie	(2014)	points	out,	not	everything	is	‘algorithm-ready’,	and	failing	to	account	for	the	resulting	omissions	would	be	“akin	to	studying	what	was	said	at	a	public	protest,	while	failing	to	notice	that	some	speakers	had	been	stopped	at	the	park	gates”.	These	complications	add	to	the	more	well-known,	but	equally	important	point	that	digital	divides	still	exist.	Big	data	is	only	as	big	as	what	digital	infrastructures,	telecom	prices	and	local	capacities	make	possible,	and	these	conditions	need	to	be	kept	in	mind	(Hilbert,	2016).	The	realization	that	data	does	not	speak	for	itself	makes	it	pertinent	to	investigate	the	second	moment	of	big	data	practices,	which	brings	up	the	issue	of	how	analyses	are	crafted.	Big	data	often	considered	a	break	with	traditional	forms	of	knowledge	production	such	as	random	sampling	and	deductive	hypothesis-testing	on	limited	samples.	Instead,	big	data	promises	analyses	of	all	available	data	(Hilbert,	2016)	–	both	in	terms	of	inclusion	and	granularity	–	and	more	inductive	forms	of	pattern	recognition.	These	intersections	and	differences	between	big	data	and	more	established	ways	of	producing	knowledge	are	central	(Mayer-Schönberger	&	Cukier,	2013;	Hansen	&	Flyverbom,	2014)	and	remind	us	that	one	of	the	foundations	of	governance	and	power	is	knowledge	production	(Scott,	1998).		All	kinds	of	knowledge	production	involve	choices	about	sources,	methods	and	goals.	This	is	obvious	when	we	look	at	more	traditional	forms	of	knowledge	used	for	political	purposes,	such	as	narratives	or	numbers,	and	their	shortcomings	are	very	well	studied	and	understood.		Along	similar	lines,	we	need	more	fine-grained	investigations	of	the	practices,	worldviews	and	material	objects	at	work	in	big	data	analyses	–	what	Amoore	&	Piotukh	(2015)	term	the	‘little	analytics	of	big	data’.	Also,	it	is	important	for	scholars	interested	in	big	data	to	pay	attention	to	the	intricate	relations	between	what	we	can	think	of	as	seeing,	knowing	and	governing	(Flyverbom,	Leonardi,	Stohl	&	Stohl,	2016).	
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This	implies	in	particular	that	we	remember	that	all	types	of	knowledge	production	and	visualization	have	implications	for	what	we	consider	important	and	possible	to	govern.		
Calculative	rationalities	Big	data	unsettles	established	ways	of	doing	governance	by	affording	new	(dis)connections	between	activities	on	‘the	ground’	and	favoring	particular	political	rationalities.	When	inquiring	into	the	third	moment	of	big	data	practices	it	is	important	to	understand	such	unsettlements.	For	instance,	by	introducing	algorithmic	operations	and	calculations	into	governance	efforts,	we	move	closer	to	future	scenarios	such	as	intelligent	refrigerators	that	will	order	new	milk	before	we	run	out,	cities	that	will	arrange	busses	exactly	when	and	where	they	are	needed,	and	drones	that	will	take	out	terrorists	before	they	commit	attacks.		Such	forms	of	‘algorithmic	regulation’	(O’Reilly,	2013)	are	considered	a	valuable	source	of	innovation	in	governance	and	politics	by	some,	in	particular	because	they	offer	more	data-driven,	‘rational’	and	less	idiosyncratic	forms	of	policy-making.	As	a	policy	director	at	Google	put	it,	datafication	allows	for	‘policy	by	numbers’	rather	than	‘policy	by	emotions’	(interviews,	Google,	2011).	Similarly,	O’Reilly	(2013)	suggests	that	big	data	may	“reduce	the	amount	of	regulation	while	actually	increasing	the	amount	of	oversight	and	production	of	desirable	outcomes”.		But	others	warn	us	strongly	against	trusting	technology	and	data	as	an	engine	of	policy-making	and	governance.	The	main	arguments	are	that	such	algorithmic	forms	of	governance	will	lead	to	the	‘death	of	politics’	where	technocratic	and	measurement-oriented	’Silicon	Valley	logics’	replace	politics,	history	and	experience	with	a	naïve	belief	in	data	and	algorithms	(Morozov,	2014).	As	big	data	are	not	able	to	predict	a	changing	world	(see	sub-theme	4),	such	developments,	it	is	feared,	will	undermine	democracy,	the	welfare	state	and	the	long-term	focus	on	enabling	human	well-being.	Similarly,	Zuboff	(2015:	81)	warns	us	against	this	“ubiquitous	networked	institutional	regime	that	records,	modifies,	and	commodifies	everyday	experience	from	toasters	to	bodies,	communication	to	thought,	all	with	a	view	to	establishing	new	pathways	to	monetization	and	profit.	Big	Other	is	the	sovereign	power	of	a	near	future	that	annihilates	the	freedom	achieved	by	the	rule	of	law”.		Even	if	we	have	less	gloomy	expectations	about	the	effects	of	big	data,	these	arguments	accentuate	the	need	explore	the	datafication	of	governance	from	more	agnostic	starting	points	than	the	forms	of	‘technophobia’	and	‘dataphilia’	that	currently	shape	public	discourse	about	the	topic.	Datafication	naturally	pushes	the	frontier	between	political	and	technocratic	decision	making.	By	delivering	convincing	evidence,	big	data	approaches	promise	to	transfer	several	questions	that	were	formally	in	the	domain	of	political	deliberation	into	the	domain	of	technocratic	decision	making.	Obviously,	this	can	go	too	far	and	dig	data	and	algorithmic	approaches	can	re-articulate	heated	political	controversies	as	administrative	or	technological	matters,	i.e.	contribute	to	‘post-political’	forms	of	governance	(Garsten	&	Jacobsson,	2013).			Think	for	instance	of	the	difference	between	treating	terrorism	as	a	historical,	socio-economic	issue	(which	would	look	at	its	foundations	and	causes)	and	approaching	it	as	an	informational	problem	(focusing	on	how	to	compile	enough	signals	to	predict	when	a	terrorist	is	about	to	strike).	Future	research	should	pay	attention	to	the	calculative	rationalities	and	conceptions	of	the	relationship	between	knowledge	and	politics	that	underpin	different	interpretations	of	the	effects	of	datafication	for	governance	(Hansen	and	Flyverbom,	2014).	This	is	particularly	important	because	datafication	reframes	‘key	
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questions	about	the	constitution	of	knowledge,	the	processes	of	research,	how	we	should	engage	with	information,	and	the	nature	and	categorization	of	reality’	(Boyd	and	Crawford,	2012:	665).	Another	relevant	component	of	the	calculative	rationalities	shaping	datafied	governance	concerns	the	lack	of	transparency	when	it	comes	to	the	operations	and	worldviews	involved.	Big	data	analyses	are	crafted	at	a	distance	from	human	experience,	and	the	mechanisms	and	operations	involved	are	often	completely	illegible	and	“beyond	immediate	social	inspection	and	control”	(Kallinkos	and	Constantiou,	2015:	72).	One	suggestion	is	that	we	need	more	‘algorithmic	transparency’	(Pasquale,	2015)	and	similar	ways	of	assessing	the	worldviews	and	rationalities	driving	algorithmic	forms	of	governance.	Taken	together,	these	discussions	highlight	the	epistemological	and	ontological	foundations	of	the	datafication	of	governance	and	deserve	further	examination	if	we	want	to	understand	the	social	and	political	implications	of	these	developments.	
Temporal	orientations	A	third	issue,	which	is	also	related	to	the	third	moment	of	big	data	practices,	concerns	the	way	datafication	reconfigures	the	orientation	and	significance	of	time	in	governance.	Although	velocity	is	often	mentioned	as	a	defining	feature	of	big	data,	such	questions	point	to	a	more	foundational	matter.	The	temporal	orientations	afforded	by	big	data	differ	markedly	from	more	traditional	forms	of	knowledge	production	involved	in	governance.	This	takes	various	forms.	For	instance,	moving	from	household	surveys	and	similar	sources	of	knowledge	to	big	data	aggregations	may	reduce	the	time	lag	between	the	start	of	a	trend	and	the	response	by	governments	and	other	authorities.	Efforts	such	as	Google	Flu	Trends	that	relies	on	search	queries	as	a	way	to	predict	flu	outbreaks,	and	the	work	of	UN	Global	Pulse	to	detect	food	crises	based	on	tweets	and	other	digital	traces	point	to	these	possibilities	when	it	comes	to	speeding	up	analytical	operations	to	real-time	(Global	Pulse,	2011).		But	big	data	also	alters	our	conception	of	time	in	more	fundamental	ways.	Whereas	governance	usually	relies	on	standardized	principles,	agreements	and	laws	that	are	developed	and	institutionalized	over	time,	and	adapts	rather	slowly	and	in	largely	reactive	ways,	big	data	offers	more	proactive	and	anticipatory	approaches.	Assessing	what	might	happen	next	and	preparing	for	future	events	is	a	key	component	of	governance,	and	big	data	promises	novel	ways	of	producing	foresight	that	can	be	used	to	take	timely	action.	Anticipation,	and	temporal	orientations	more	generally,	are	a	central,	but	under-researched	issue	in	governance	and	politics,	and	datafication	processes	invite	us	to	give	more	attention	to	emergent	ways	of	making	sense	of	and	relating	to	future	developments.	The	point	is	not	that	big	data	can	be	used	to	predict	the	future	per	se,	but	rather	that	this	phenomenon	challenges	and	expands	our	temporal	orientation	in	governance	efforts.		Along	these	lines,	datafied	governance	can	also	be	seen	as	a	form	of	continuous	testing,	where	new	signals	and	emergent	correlations	can	be	used	to	optimize	and	test	the	potential	value	of	an	effort	or	focus	area.		This	dimension	of	the	datafication-governance	nexus	reminds	us	that	questions	of	big	data	and	anticipation	deserve	more	attention.	The	increasing	reliance	on	digital	traces	in	risk	calculations,	predictive	policing,	global	foresight	and	similar	attempts	to	govern	‘imagined	futures’	(Beckert,	2016)	makes	it	pertinent	to	explore	how	datafication	facilitates	new	forms	of	anticipatory	governance.	We	will	return	to	the	foundation	of	such	anticipations	in	sub-theme	4.		
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Sub-theme	II:	Who	are	the	political	subjects	of	big	data?3	That	so	much	of	social	and	political	life	is	being	conducted	through	the	Internet	calls	for	critical	framings	of	how	power	relations	are	ever	more	entwined	with	digital	life	and	data.	In	relation	to	this	we	would	like	to	argue	that	the	multiple	ways	that	subjects	act	through	the	Internet	ought	to	be	our	starting	point	for	analysis.	It	is	an	argument	that	recognises	that	subjects	cannot	act	in	isolation	but	only	in	relation	to	the	mediations,	regulations	and	monitoring	of	the	platforms,	devices,	and	algorithms	or	more	generally	the	conventions	that	format,	organize	and	order	what	they	do,	how	they	relate,	act,	interact,	and	transact	through	the	Internet.		Understanding	these	relations	is	especially	called	for	as	governments,	international	organisations	and	corporations	increasingly	appropriate	big	data	to	monitor,	know,	and	govern	populations.	How	are	the	subjects	of	big	data	conceived?		Principally,	they	are	often	assumed	as	data	subjects	because	they	(should)	receive	data	protection	(see	eg.	Franklin	2013;	Crowe	2013	and	Glennie	2013).	This	is	well	illustrated	in	the	focus	of	government	programmes	on	questions	of	ethics	and	privacy	where	solutions	involve	ensuring	anonymisation	and	the	non-disclosure	of	identities.	Political	concerns	are	then	defined	in	closely	related	terms	such	as	the	potential	sensitivity	of	topics,	and	perceptions	or	risks	of	surveillance.		Such	legal	framings	often	implicitly	or	explicitly	regard	people	as	passive	subjects	in	need	of	protection.	Of	course,	this	is	important	and	people	are	rarely	aware	or	knowledgeable	about	the	kinds	of	data	collected	by	the	tracking	of	their	activities.	Yet,	it	is	also	important	to	remember	that	people	are	not	simply	data	subjects	but	conduct	themselves	as	performative	rights-claiming	subjects.	That	is,	making	rights	claims	involves	not	only	legal	and	imaginary	but	also	performative	forces.	This	is	a	conception	of	political	subjectivity	advanced	in	critical	citizenship	studies,	which	conceive	of	the	citizen	beyond	its	modern	configuration	as	simply	a	member	of	the	nation-state.	Instead,	citizenship	is	seen	as	a	site	of	contestation	or	social	struggle	rather	than	made	up	of	bundles	of	given	rights	and	duties.		Here	we	take	up	this	conception	in	relation	to	how	subjects	become	digital	citizens	when	they	make	rights	claims	in	and	by	what	they	do	or	say	through	the	Internet	(Isin	and	Ruppert,	2015).4	In	other	words,	who	they	become	as	political	subjects—or	subjects	of	any	kind,	for	that	matter—is	neither	given	or	determined	but	enacted	by	what	subjects	do	in	relation	to	others	and	things.	This	then	has	consequences	for	the	very	data	that	governing	authorities	seek	to	collect	and	analyse	and	act	upon.	For	this	reason,	inquiring	about	who	are	political	subjects	of	big	data	is	relevant	in	relation	to	all	three	moments	of	big	data	practices.		
																																																								3	Sub-theme	2	was	written	by	Evelyn	Ruppert.	Funding	from	a	European	Research	Council	(ERC)	Consolidator	Grant	(615588)	supported	the	research	and	writing	of	this	section.	4	The	argument	in	this	section	draws	from	Isin	and	Ruppert’s	book,	which	contends	that	studies	of	the	Internet	and	empirical	analyses	of	specific	digital	platforms	are	proliferating,	yet	we	lack	concepts	for	framing	and	interpreting	what	these	mean	for	political	subjectivities	and	being	digital	citizens.	The	objective	of	the	book	then	is	to	focus	on	theorizing	what	is	referred	to	as	digital	acts	and	digital	citizens	with	the	understanding	that	such	theorizing	is	necessary	to	clear	the	ground	for	more	detailed	empirical	investigations.	
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It	is	instructive	to	first	consider	this	conception	in	relation	to	the	imaginaries	of	the	Internet	that	have	for	over	twenty	years	shaped	how	we	think	of	the	subject.	One	celebrates	the	libertarian	possibilities	while	another	laments	the	obedient	qualities	of	acting	through	the	Internet.	While	the	latter	have	been	a	good	correction	to	former,	they	have	replaced	sovereign	subjects	with	obedient	ones.	In	this	way,	they	reflect	a	reversal	of	the	understanding	of	power	advanced	in	modern	political	theory,	which	posits	a	divide	between	modernity	and	tradition	where	a	subject	to	power	(tradition)	was	replaced	by	a	subject	of	power	(modernity).	Modern	political	theory	upheld	the	arrival	of	the	latter	as	the	displacement	of	the	former.	In	contrast,	critical	political	theory	questions	both	the	divide	and	displacement	and	asserts	that	a	subject	is	a	composite	of	multiple	forces,	identifications,	affiliations,	and	associations.	The	subject	itself	is	a	site	of	myriad	forms	of	power	(sovereign,	disciplinary,	control)	that	embodies	composite	dispositions	(obedience,	submission,	subversion).		This	is	an	understanding	of	power	advanced	by	Etienne	Balibar	(1991)	through	his	reading	of	Michel	Foucault.	Balibar	conceived	of	the	citizen	as	not	merely	a	subject	to	power	or	subject	of	power	but	one	who	embodies	both.	Balibar	argued	that	being	a	subject	to	power	involves	domination	by	and	obedience	to	a	sovereign	whereas	being	a	subject	of	power	involves	being	an	agent	of	power	even	if	this	requires	participating	in	one’s	own	submission.	However,	it	is	this	participation	that	opens	up	possibilities	of	subversion	and	this	is	what	distinguishes	the	citizen	from	the	subject:	she	is	a	composite	subject	where	all	three	forms	of	power	are	always-present	dynamic	potentialities.			Such	a	conception	moves	us	away	from	how	we	are	being	‘liberated’	or	‘controlled’	to	the	complexities	of	‘acting’	through	the	Internet.	This	understanding	of	subjectivation	stands	against	that	of	interpellation,	which	assumes	that	subjects	are	always	and	already	formed	and	inhabited	by	external	forces.	Of	course,	one	cannot	act	in	isolation	but	only	in	relation	to	the	mediations,	regulations	and	monitoring	of	the	platforms,	devices,	and	algorithms	or	more	generally	the	conventions	that	format,	organize	and	order	what	subjects	do,	how	they	relate,	act,	interact,	and	transact	through	the	Internet.		And	as	Bigo	argues,	if	the	conduct	of	data	subjects	conflicts	with	behaviour	targeted	by	algorithms,	then	their	digital	rights	will	come	into	question	(Bigo,	2013).	However,	such	participation	involves	the	play	of	obedience,	submission	and	also	subversion	and	the	possibility	of	new	forms	of	subjectivity	that	are	often	reflexive	of	the	consequences	of	making	rights	claims	by	acting	through	the	Internet.5		It	is	this	form	of	participation	that	distinguishes	the	subject	from	the	digital	citizen.		How	then	do	subjects	make	rights	claims	and	become	digital	citizens?	Words	are	of	course	one	way	that	they	make	claims	to	rights	such	as	speech,	access,	and	privacy.	As	Austin	(1962)	famously	argued,	language	is	a	means	of	social	action:	people	do	things	with	words.	In	this	regard	he	defined	five	classes	of	speech	acts	that	can	have	performative	force:	judgments,	decisions,	commitments,	acknowledgements,	and	clarifications.	However,	these	do	not	account	for	the	claims	of	subjects	who	articulate	‘I,																																																									5	Bauman	et	al	(2014),	in	relation	to	the	Snowden	revelations,	ask	how	surveillance	strategies	might	not	only	be	resisted	but	how	subjects	might	adjust	their	conduct	and	develop	‘new	forms	of	subjectivity	that	is	more	reflexive	about	the	consequences	of	their	own	actions’	(124).		They	also	note	that	subjects	can	play	a	variety	of	games	and	resignify	the	meanings	of	sovereignty	and	citizenship,	security,	and	liberty.		
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we,	they	have	a	right	to’.	Claims	are	thus	a	sixth	speech	act	and	key	to	becoming	a	citizen.		To	be	sure	citizens	make	rights	claims	through	what	they	say	as	many	individual	and	collective	declarations	attest.	Chelsea	Manning	(2015),	for	example,	says	‘We’re	citizens,	not	subjects.	We	have	the	right	to	criticize	government	without	fear’.	Many	citizens	also	call	upon	authorities	for	the	inscription	of	digital	rights	through	regulations	and	legislation	to	give	them	legal	force.	But	citizens	not	only	make	digital	rights	claims	in	or	by	what	they	say	about	those	rights	in	declarations	and	manifestos	(imaginary)	and	when	they	call	upon	authorities	for	the	inscription	of	those	rights	(legality)	but	also	by	acting	through	the	Internet	(performativity).	However,	what	subjects	do	through	the	Internet	involves	not	only	doing	things	with	words	but	also	the	reverse	of	Austin’s	principle:	they	also	say	words	with	things.	Subjects	make	claims	through	their	deeds,	by	doing	words	with	the	things	that	make	up	the	Internet.		As	Franklin	argues,	declarations,	case	law,	technical	standards,	and	international	treaties,	while	having	best	intentions,	do	not	attend	to	how	‘ordinary	people	use	the	internet	in	their	everyday	life’	(Franklin,	2013).	From	downloading,	uploading,	forwarding,	and	blocking	to	encrypting	and	cloaking	their	actions,	digital	citizens	make	claims	to	rights	such	as	to	access,	share	or	make	private	what	they	do	through	the	Internet.	While	much	attention	is	reserved	for	whistleblowers	and	hactivists	as	the	vanguards	of	Internet	rights,	there	are	many	more	anonymous	political	subjects	of	the	Internet	who	not	only	make	rights	claims	by	saying	things	but	also	by	doing	things	through	the	Internet.	This	affords	an	opportunity	to	understand	how	the	everyday	social	life	of	communicating,	interacting	and	networking	are	part	of	struggles	and	contestations	over	the	emergence	of	a	new	political	subjectivity.	So	when	we	study	conventions	such	as	microblogging	we	can	ask:	how	do	such	platforms	both	configure	everyday	conduct	and	at	the	same	time	create	possibilities	for	digital	citizens	to	act?	What	are	the	possibilities	of	subjects	thinking,	speaking,	and	acting	differently,	of	challenging	and	resignifying	conventions	of	the	Internet	and	thereby	enacting	digital	rights	through	what	they	do	and	not	only	say?	If	what	subjects	are	saying	and	doing	through	the	Internet	is	changing	political	subjectivity	and	how	they	understand	themselves	as	political	subjects	then	what	does	this	mean	for	the	data	that	is	generated	in	the	first	moment	of	big	data	practices?	Bringing	the	political	subject	to	the	centre	of	concern	offers	a	way	to	investigate	how	their	acts	matter	in	the	making	of	data.	This	challenges	interpretations	of	big	data	as	measures	of	‘actual’	behaviour,	which	reduce	all	conduct	to	clicks	and	movements.	Rather	the	data	generated	through	the	Internet	is	not	apart	from	the	multiple	ways	of	acting	that	can	be	strategic,	subversive,	and	inventive;	how	to	attend	to	these	and	their	consequences	for	the	making	and	interpretation	of	big	data	is	one	of	many	theoretical	and	empirical	challenges.			We	woud	like	to	argue	that	the	multiple	ways	that	subjects	act	through	the	Internet	ought	to	be	our	starting	point	for	analysis.	With	ever	more	tracing	and	tracking	and	selling	and	trading	of	data,	how	subjects	are	making	rights	claims	by	blocking	and	filtering,	encrypting	communications,	creating	multiple	and	anonymised	and	shared	identities,	deploying	bots,	gaming	trending	algorithms,	and	so	on	can	be	the	question	we	start	with.	Even	for	those	subjects	who	obey	and	adhere	to	conventions,	how	have	their	acts	and	the	digital	data	they	generate	been	configured	by	variations	in	what	they	do	through	the	Internet?		How	do	they	act	in	multiple	and	not	only	pre-formed	ways?	To	
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pose	these	qustions	is	not	to	ignore	dominant	forms	of	subjectivation	but	even	these	call	for	closer	analysis	in	relation	to	how	subjects	are	formed	and	act.	To	reduce	all	forms	of	acting	to	one	unexamined	mode	is	to	also	to	overlook	the	potentialities	and	possibilities	of	acting	otherwise	and	that	acting	through	the	Internet	is	not	homogenous	and	universal	but	fragmented,	multiple,	and	agonistic.		These	questions	are	especially	critical	given	the	tendency	to	treat	digital	data	as	raw.	We	now	have	myriad	studies	that	challenge	this	by	accounting	for	the	relations	between	and	among	people	and	technologies	that	come	to	make	it	up	(Ruppert	et	al,	2013).	But	we	also	need	a	framing	to	understand	how	these	involve	power	relations	and	embodied	subjects	and	citizens	who	act	through	the	Internet	and	whose	acts	are	a	part	of	the	relations	that	make	data.	Another	challenge	in	answering	the	question	of	who	is	the	political	subject	of	big	data	is	that	digital	life	flows	across	national	regulatory	jurisdictions,	that	the	corporations	who	collect	and	own	this	data	are	transnational,	and	that	the	rights	claims	of	citizens	increasingly	traverse	multiple	legal	and	usually	national	orders.	This	raises	interesting	issues	in	relation	to	the	third	moment	of	big	data	practices.	In	relation	to	security,	Bauman	et	al.	argue	that	big	data	blurs	what	is	‘domestic’	and	what	is	‘foreign,’	and	reconfigures	the	boundaries	of	the	sovereign	state	and	turns	it	into	a	site	of	political	struggles,	resistance	and	dissent	(Bauman	et	al,	2014).	Because	the	acts	of	subjects	traverse	so	many	borders	and	involve	a	multiplicity	of	legal	orders,	identifying	who	is	this	political	subject	has	become	a	fundamental	challenge.		So	far,	describing	this	transversal	political	subject	as	a	global	citizen	or	cosmopolitan	citizen	has	proved	challenging	if	not	contentious	(see	e.g.	Archibugi	2008	and	Schattle,	2008).	Indeed,	sovereign	regional	or	national	legal	orders	and	their	understanding	of	rights	are	not	capable	of	addressing	this	political	subjectivity.	However,	securing	digital	rights	requires	not	only	their	legal	inscription	but	also	recognition	of	how	their	daily	enactment	is	also	constitutive	of	rights	claims	and	the	formation	of	this	new	political	subjectivity.	Such	an	understanding	moves	beyond	legally	securing	the	rights	of	data	subjects	to	recognising	the	claims	and	struggles	of	citizens	for	rights	over	the	data	generated	by	their	acts	through	the	Internet.		
Sub-theme	III:	Dymanics	if	valuation	in	big	data	governance6	We	have	already	argued	that	one	of	the	central	characteristics	of	big	data	is	that	it	is	varied.	In	fact,	the	possibility	to	cross-aggregate	data	from	various	digitized	sources	is	one	of	the	characteristics	that	makes	big	data	projects	distinct	from	other	types	of	analysis.	This	means	that	their	success	is	dependent	upon	a	successful	construction	of	a	digitized	space	where	a	variation	of	data	points	can	cross-fertilize	each	other.		The	creation	of	such	a	space	naturally	poses	several	technical	challenges.	In	order	to	conduct	analyses	across	data	from	distinct	sources	there	is	a	need	to	ensure	that	data	is	stored	in	compatible	formats,	that	meta-data	structures	are	consistent,	that	there	is	enough	computational	power	to	run	complex	analyses	and	so	forth.	Any	big	data	project	needs	to	find	ways	of	handling	such	technical	challenges.		However,	technical	challenges	are	only	a	fraction	of	the	challenges	that	arise	from	the	ambition	to	cross-aggregate	data	from	varied	sources.	Most	importantly,	big	data																																																									6	Sub-theme	3	was	written	by	Anders	Koed	Madsen	
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projects	often	involve	an	ambition	to	cross-fertilize	data	points	from	sources	owned	by	different	organizations	and	companies.	For	instance,	when	using	data	to	respond	to	disasters	such	as	a	flood,	one	needs	data	from	weather	stations,	sewage	companies,	public	administrations	and	so	forth,	In	other	words,	governance	oriented	big	data	projects	most	often	require	the	establishment	of	novel	data-partnerships	between	the	involved	parties.		Studies	of	recent	big	data	projects	indicate	that	challenges	stemming	from	such	partnerships	are	harder	to	solve	than	clearly	defined	technical	problems	(Madsen,	2013).	More	specifically,	it	seems	that	emerging	partnerships	raise	complex	questions	about	the	valuation	of	data.	How	can	different	data	points	be	compared	and	valued?	How	can	incentives	be	created	for	different	partners	to	share	data?	How	is	data	to	be	payed	for	by	potential	users?	What	is	the	epistemic	value	of	different	data	sources	when	making	decisons?	What	is	the	relation	between	epistemic	value,	knowledge	and	action?		A	research	agenda	for	big	data	in	the	context	of	international	political	sociology	must	include	ways	of	inquiring	into	such	questions.	They	are	crucial	for	understanding	how	big	data	creates	transversal	connections,	i.e.	connections	across	instituted	agencies	and	(data)	boundaries,	and	for	understanding	how	value	judgements	are	enacted	in	the	transformation	of	’data’	into	’big	data’.	We	want	to	argue	that	a	fruitful	startingpoint	from	which	to	iquire	into	such	questions	is	to	take	inspiration	from	a	recent	substring	of	economic	sociology	–	valuation	studies.	Valuation	studies	have	challenged	the	idea	that	assets	have	intrinsic	value	and	emphasized	the	fact	that	valuation	is	something	that	is	obtained	through	practice	(Muniesa	et	al.,	2007;	Espeland	&	Stevens,	1998;	Stark,	2011).	However,	studies	in	this	tradition	have	mainly	focused	on	the	function	of	market	devices.	That	is,	technologies	that	enable	things	to	be	comparatively	priced.	However,	the	practice	of	valuation	can	also	be	more	broadly	conceived	as	an	act	of	ordering	that	establishes	a	foundation	for	the	prioritization	of	various	kinds	of	scarce	resources	(Madsen,	2015).		A	research	agenda	with	theoretical	roots	in	this	line	of	work	can	therefore	underpin	inquiries	into	the	way	valuation	occurs	in	relation	to	less	tangible	objects	such	as	data.	Most	importantly,	it	can	prompt	researchers	to	problematize	the	idea	of	data	as	having	intrinsic	value,	and	instead	turn	to	the	social,	organizational	and	political	construction	and	production	of	data-points	as	valuable	objects.	Such	a	focus	must	also	include	sensitivity	towards	possible	frictions	between	different	ways	of	sorting,	valuating,	and	attaching	legitimacy	to	data	in	a	specific	developmental	context.		The	importance	of	this	line	of	research	is	best	illustrated	through	a	brief	look	at	recent	projects	that	use	big	data	as	a	tool	of	governance.	We	want	to	provide	two	such	examples.	The	first	example	emphasizes	the	need	to	establish	an	exchange	value	of	data	in	a	Copenhagen-based	Smart	City	project	that	required	previously	unrelated	organizations	and	companies	to	share	data.	The	second	example	illustrates	the	problem	of	determining	the	epistemic	value	of	tweets	as	a	new	data	source	to	inform	decision-making	in	the	UN.	Accordingly,	these	two	examples	draw	our	attention	to	relevant	dynamics	of	valuation	at	the	first	and	third	moment	of	a	big	data	practice.			
Establishing	exchange	value	in	a	City	Data	Market	in	Copenhagen	The	municipality	of	Copenhagen	has	recently	launched	a	strategy	that	includes	an	ambition	of	being	at	the	forefront	of	the	Smart	City	movement.	That	means	using	big	
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data	analysis	to	improve	the	response	of	the	public	administration	when	it	is	faced	with	problems	such	as	traffic	jams	and	floodings.		Therefore,	in	2014,	the	city	established	a	specific	governing	body	for	smart	city	projects	across	all	sectors	in	the	city.	This	body	was	named	Copenhagen	Solutions	Lab	(CSL)	and	it	was	instructed	to	have	focus	on	creating	triple	helix	partnerships.	In	other	words,	the	implementation	of	innovation	and	smart	city	development	was	to	be	done	in	close	collaboration	with	knowledge	institutions	and	companies	as	well	as	citizens.		CSL	quickly	came	to	the	conclusion	that	in	order	to	make	any	useful	governance	tools	there	was	a	need	to	establish	a	database	with	an	interface	that	allows	distinct	actors	to	collaborate	and	share	data.	For	instance,	in	order	to	visualize	the	flow	of	water	after	a	heavy	rainfall	the	municipality	needs	sewage	data	form	a	private	contrator,	weather	data	from	a	ministerially	owed	metrological	institute	and	behavioral	data	from	citizens.	In	order	to	guide	parents	to	the	nearest	playground	they	need	data	for	the	various	private	contractors	running	the	playgrounds.	In	order	to	intervene	in	traffic	congestion	they	need	data	from	the	semi-private	Danish	Railways,	the	bus	company	MOVIA	and	so	forth.	In	short,	no	governance	related	initiative	could	be	successfully	conducted	within	the	existing	municipal	database.		The	chosen	solution	was	to	build	a	data	marketplace	that	would	enable	private	and	public	data	to	be	stored	in	a	common	database	on	top	of	which	hackers	and	app-developers	could	build	useful	applications.	In	other	words,	the	big	data	ambitions	of	Copenhagen	sparked	a	process	that	can	only	be	understood	as	a	form	of	market	creation	and	valuation.	Furthermore,	the	most	complicated	questions	emerging	from	this	process	were	not	the	ones	addressing	how	to	build	the	technical	infrastructure.	They	concern	the	complex	practices	of	data-valuation.		For	instance,	in	order	to	function	the	marketplace	must	be	able	to	work	with	several	layers	of	data	openness.	There	will	inevitably	be	projects	where	private	data	owners	agree	to	share	data	with	each	other	and	the	municipality	but	not	with	a	broader	public.	Making	such	layers	is	not	a	technical	problem	but	rather	a	problem	in	establishing	a	trust	among	the	partners	that	the	interface	and	the	partners	in	the	market	respect	the	
strategic	value	of	their	data.		A	related	matter	concerns	the	need	to	establish	an	exchange	value	of	data.	For	instance,	what	is	real-time	updated	sewage	data	worth	compared	to	a	data	from	a	coffeeshop	showing	ques	in	front	of	their	store?	Is	the	temporality	of	data	(how	often	is	it	updated?)	a	factor	to	include	in	such	a	valuation	or	should	other	criteria	be	applied?	When	such	questions	are	answered	the	next	one	emerges:	How	are	users	to	pay	for	data?	Can	you	make	a	subscription	to	a	data	feed?	Can	subscription	prices	vary	with	the	kind	of	data	requested?	Can	you	only	pay	with	money	or	can	you	pay	with	data	–	or	perhaps	analytical	skills	and	hardware	power?	The	City	Data	Market	has	not	yet	found	the	right	solutions	to	such	questions.	It	takes	time	to	build	a	market.	But	the	character	of	the	problems	is	illustrative	of	the	argument	that	a	research	agenda	for	inquiring	into	big	data	in	International	relations	must	focus	on	dynamics	related	to	data	valuation	in	the	first	moment	of	big	data	practices.	The	way	such	challenges	are	handled	influence	the	data	available	for	governance	before	it	even	enters	the	second	or	third	moment.		The	Copenhagen	example	shows	the	importance	of	attending	to	the	strategic	value	as	weel	as	the	exchange	value	when	organizing	data	
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partnerships.	The	next	case	will	supplement	with	the	need	to	understand	the	epistemic	
valuations	of	data	in	the	third	moment	of	a	big	data	practice.		
Re-thinking	epistemic	values	in	the	UN’s	crisis	response		In	2009	The	United	Nations	established	Global	Pulse	–	a	flagship	initiative	under	the	Secretary	General	with	the	aim	of	exploring	the	potentials	of	using	big	data	as	a	possibility	to	accelerate	discovery,	development	and	innovation	for	sustainable	development	and	humanitarian	action.	The	idea	was	that	big	data	–	such	as	online	traces	–	could	be	used	as	a	real-time	indicator	of	public	well-being	and	act	as	a	feedback	mechanism	on	the	workings	of	policy	interventions	(Madsen,	2013).		The	initiative	is	organized	around	public-private	partnerships.	Unsurprisingly,	it	has	also	faced	problems	about	the	strategic	value	and	exchange	value	of	data.	For	instance,	it	has	promoted	the	concept	of	‘data	philanthropy’	to	indicate	sharing	data	as	an	act	of	social	responsibility	that	can	ultimately	have	an	effect	on	brand	value	(Kirkpatrick,	2011).	However,	since	we	have	already	touched	upon	these	forms	of	valuation	above,	we	will	focus	on	how	the	Global	Pulse	have	also	raised	questions	about	the	epistemic	
value	in	the	third	moments	of	a	big	data	practice.			Such	valuation	dynamics	stems	from	the	fact	that	much	of	the	data	that	the	initiative	works	with	data	that	has	quite	different	characteristics	from	the	kind	of	data	that	is	usually	judged	as	having	high	epistemic	value	in	the	organization.	For	instance,	one	project	of	Global	Pulse	has	been	to	use	sentiment	in	tweets	to	predict	prices	of	rice	in	Indonesia.	This	is	a	very	different	mode	of	knowledge-production	than	a	technology	like	the	household	survey	that	has	traditionally	been	used	to	monitor	crisis-prone	populations.	It	is	quite	simply	a	different	kind	of	foundation	from	which	to	make	decisions	about	crisis	management	(Madsen,	2015).		The	fact	that	tweets	have	different	affordances	than	survey	responses	can	be	illustrated	by	three	examples.	First,	when	Twitter	data	comes	within	the	reach	of	the	UN	it	has	already	been	formatted	in	specific	ways.	It	comes	in	chunks	of	140	characters	and	it	is	ordered	though	specific	user-generated	meta-data	such	as	hashtags	(#)	and	replies	(@).	Such	choices	about	data	formatting	are	beyond	the	control	of	the	intended	users	in	the	UN.	Second,	it	is	produced	on	an	interface	that	is	not	designed	with	the	intention	to	produce	reliable	crisis-signals.	To	the	contrary	it	is	designed	to	make	people	communicate	in	specific	event-driven	ways	that	is	of	value	to	Twitter,	Inc.	(Rogers	2013).	Third,	the	flow	of	data	obtained	from	the	API	is	so	large	and	fast	paced,	that	parts	of	the	data	analysis	need	to	be	automated.	A	human	expert	cannot	routinely	oversee	the	data	behind	the	visualization	because	such	a	check	would	require	an	excessive	amount	of	human	brainpower.	The	result	of	these	conditions	for	data	production	is	that	their	epistemic	value	is	not	given	–	Twitter	is	a	source	of	data	that	need	to	be	valuated	anew	by	decision-makers	in	the	organization.	As	the	director	of	Global	Pulse	puts	it:	“It	is	not	just	about	getting	the	data;	it	is	also	[…]	about	the	organizational	capacity	to	facture	a	snapshot	of	these	types	of	information	in	the	context	of	their	on-going	policy	development	planning”	(Madsen	2012).	This	capacity	is	dependent	on	whether	or	not	the	organization	recognizes	the	
epistemic	value	of	the	data.	That	is,	whether	is	is	deemed	legitimate	enough	to	base	decisions	upon.		Accordingly,	the	case	of	Global	Pulse	illstrates	that	the	relevent	valuations	processes	to	pay	attention	to	in	the	context	of	big	data	is	not	just	about	
exchange	value	and	strategic	value	of	data.	A	reserach	agenda	must	also	inquire	into	the	
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way	the	epistemic	value	of	data	is	established	and	think	about	the	way	such	valuation	influces	the	existing	modes	of	governance.			
Sub-theme	IV:	Big	data	creating	futures:	the	importance	of	theory	driven	data	production7		As	powerful	as	empirical	data	analysis	might	be,	there	is	a	fundamental	limit	to	the	power	of	big	data.	The	reason	is	not	technological	or	methodological,	and	cannot	be	easily	solved	through	any	kind	of	technological	or	scientific	progress.	Instead,	it	leads	us	deep	down	the	rabbit	hole	of	the	philosophy	of	science.	All	data	(big	or	not)	are	from	the	past	—	or,	at	best,	the	‘real-time	past’	(as	soon	as	something	is	recorded	and	becomes	data,	the	recorded	activity	has	past).	So	any	data	analysis	can	only	tell	us	about	what	has	already	happened.	It	cannot	tell	us	about	things	that	have	never	happened.	This	is	an	important	point	to	remember	when	inquiring	into	the	second	moment	of	big	data	practices.	Patterns	and	predictions	are	naturally	path-dependent	when	they	are	based	on	empirical	data,	which	is	always	from	the	past.		In	cases	where	the	past,	present	and	future	follow	the	same	logic,	this	is	extremely	useful.	For	example,	in	physics,	when	the	sun	has	been	rising	for	the	past	millennia,	and	there	is	not	a	significant	change,	past	data	allows	us	to	predict	that	the	sun	will	be	rising	tomorrow	again.	The	technical	term	for	this	omnipresent	assumption	of	using	data	for	prediction	is	‘stationarity’	and	it	is	always	in	the	fine-print	of	every	predictive	statistical	analysis	of	this	type.	However,	if	significant	changes	occur	in	the	dynamic	of	the	system,	empirical	statistics	from	the	past	are,	at	best,	limited,	if	not	deceiving.	We	can	think	about	it	this	way.	It	is	true	that	Facebook,	Google	and	Amazon	can	predict	your	future	behavior	better	than	any	psychologist	—if	your	future	behavior	follows	the	same	logic	as	your	past	behavior.	If	you	fall	in	love	or	get	divorced,	if	you	change	your	job	or	the	country	where	you	live,	predictions	from	past	data	will	at	best	be	limited,	if	not	deceiving.	For	example,	data	from	the	past	alone	cannot	tell	us	what	it	would	be	like	to	live	in	a	world	without	pollution,	without	hunger,	without	wars.	How	could	it?	There	is	no	empirical	evidence	to	feed	data	analysis.	What	makes	matters	worse	is	that	most	of	what	we	do	is	to	work	hard	to	create	futures	that	are	different	from	the	past.	Most	public	and	private	sector	activities	aim	at	creating	futures	distinct	from	the	past	in	the	best	case,	we	want	to	create	‘a	better	world’.	We	do	so	by	designing	or	implementing	public	policies,	private	business	strategies	or	any	kind	of	intervention	into	the	current	trajectory.	Our	very	actions	usually	destroy	the	stationarity	of	the	time	series	of	history.	This	argument	is	known	as	the	‘Lucas	critique’	in	economics	(Lucas,	1976),	as	‘Goodhart’s	law’	in	finance	(Goodhart,	1976)	and	as	‘Campbell’s	law’	in	education	(Campbell,	1976),	all	dating	back	to	1976.		Nobel	Prize-winning	economist	Robert	Lucas	criticized	colleagues	who	used	sophisticated	statistics	to	make	economic	predictions	(‘econometrics’)	in	order	to	inform	policy	making.	He	argued	that	no	useful	information	can	emerge	from	such	analysis	because	“any	change	in	policy	will	systematically	alter	the	structure	of	econometric	models”	(Lucas,	1976).	In	other	words,	using	the	conclusions	from	our	data	analysis	to	intervene	in	the	system’s	dynamic	changes	the	system	and	therefore	leads	to	a	different	system.	Data	from	the	past	cannot	tell	us	how	this	new	system	will	behave.	
																																																								7	Sub-theme	4	was	written	by	Martin	Hilbert	
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Given	the	complexity	and	uniqueness	of	each	context,	the	result	of	such	interventions	is	almost	always	novel	and	unique	for	each	case.	One	way	to	go	about	it	is	to	take	similar	cases,	from	somewhere	else	or	from	a	different	scale,	and	to	extrapolate	to	other	cases.	For	example,	we	do	not	know	what	an	industrialized	country	(A)	would	be	like	that	is	currently	non-industrialized,	but	we	could	assume	that	we	can	statistically	extrapolate	it	from	a	version	of	the	past	development	of	another	country	(B)	that	went	through	industrialization.	This	will	work	if	we	fulfill	the	assumption	‘ceteris	paribus’	(i.e.	“all	other	things	being	equal”),	another	omnipresent	assumption	of	the	fine-print	of	statistical	analysis.	Now,	being	reasonable,	it	is	likely	that	between	country	A	and	country	B	there	are	‘other	things	not	being	equal’	besides	their	degree	of	industrialization.	Therefore,	the	explanatory	power	of	this	kind	of	statistical	extrapolation	might	be	very	limited,	if	not	deceiving	as	well.	History	is	full	of	examples.	For	example,	one	of	the	main	arguments	in	favor	of	the	transitions	from	horse	carriages	to	cars	in	cities	was	that	it	will	be	better	for	the	health	of	people,	as	horse	remainings	represented	a	severe	health	hazard	to	modernizing	cities.	There	was	no	empirical	data	available	to	predict	that	over	a	century	later	the	atmosphere	would	be	saturated	with	car	exhaust,	and	even	big	data	analysis	would	have	had	severe	problems	in	predicting	this.	In	order	to	make	predictions	in	a	changing	world,	theory	is	necessary.	The	good	news	is	that	the	digital	revolution	does	not	only	change	empirical	data	science,	but	also	theory-driven	modelling	that	allows	us	to	explore	scenarios	that	never	existed,	for	example	through	simulation	(Hilbert,	2015a).	Engineers	have	used	computers	for	a	long	time	to	simulate	buildings	and	bridges	that	never	existed.	This	also	provides	data,	but	data	that	is	invented	by	a	model	that	simulates	futures	that	have	never	existed	in	empirical	reality.	It	can	create	lots	of	data,	in	this	sense,	it	can	also	be	big	data,	but	the	idea	is	very	different	of	what	usually	is	understood	to	be	the	digital	big	data	footprint	(Hilbert,	2015b).	What	produces	data	is	not	empirical	reality,	but	theoretical	models.	These	models	create	realities	that	only	exist	“in	theory”.	They	can	be	better	or	worse,	or	simply	different	from	what	has	ever	existed.	They	are	extremely	creative	and	require	a	different	set	of	skills	than	data	analysis.	In	a	computational	science	framework,	building	models	with	digital	means	is	very	similar	to	designing	a	video	game.	They	can	be	as	visual	as	prominent	video	games	like	SimCity	(Hilbert,	2014b).	Some	branches	of	science,	industry	and	governments	are	working	on	creating	computer	simulation	models	at	high	speed.	For	example,	the	UN	Environment	Programme	has	teamed	up	with	Microsoft	Research	for	the	past	three	years	to	create	a	computer	model	that	simulates	all	ecological	life	on	Earth	(Purves	et	al.,	2013).	The	city	of	Portland	has	simulated	the	daily	behavior	of	its	1.6	million	residents	over	180,000	locations	in	a	one-to-one	fashion,	in	order	to	optimize	the	roll-out	of	a	new	light-rail	infrastructure	and	to	simulate	epidemics	(Barrett	et	al.,	2005).	Such	simulations	allow	to	explore	hypothetical	‘what-if’	questions.	They	can	be	used	to	adjust	for	local	particularities	and	today’s	computational	power	allows	for	an	impressive	amount	of	detail	and	sophistication	in	such	models	(for	an	introduction	see	Gilbert	and	Troitzsch,	2005;	or	Wilensky	and	Rand,	2015).		This	leads	us	to	another	point	that	relates	to	the	second	moment	of	big	data	practices	-	the	claim	that	big	data	leads	to	“the	end	of	theory”	(Anderson,	2003)	have	to	be	qualified.	It	is	true	that	machine	learning	and	deep	learning	approaches	are	incredibly	effective	when	working	with	stationary	sources,	such	as	physical	systems	or	natural	language	translation.	For	example,	machine	learning	has	solved	the	long-standing	
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challenge	of	natural	language	translation	better	than	any	theory	driven	approach	could	have	(Halevy,	Norvig	and	Pereira,	2009).	However,	the	ambition	of	humanity	goes	beyond	repeating	past	patterns.		The	importance	to	realize	that	big	data	can	only	work	with	past	patterns	is	also	a	concern	with	much	urgency.	Decision	based	on	data	from	the	past	can	only	replicate	past	patterns	into	the	future	and	therefore	has	the	tendency	to	lock	us	into	old	patterns	from	the	past.	It	often	even	accentuates	it,	creating	self-fulfilling	path	dependencies.	For	example,	a	largescale	study	by	Facebook	showed	that	Facebook’s	big	data	based	content	selection	algorithm	suppresses	the	exposure	to	diverse	content	by	8%	for	self-identified	liberals	and	by	5%	for	self-identified	conservatives	(Bakshy	et	al.,	2015).	Our	innate	drive	to	expose	ourselves	to	like-minded	content	out	of	comfortability	and	familiarity	only	reduces	our	exposure	to	less	diverse	content	by	6%	(for	liberals)	(Bakshy	et	al.,	2015).	In	other	words,	the	big	data	Facebook	algorithm	doubles	our	path	dependency,	locking	us	into	our	past	patterns	with	twice	the	force	that	we	choose	to.	As	this	reinforces	the	past,	it	can	lead	to	polarization	and	even	extremism,	which	is	very	relevant	from	a	perspective	of	international	political	sociology.		In	order	to	create	change,	in	order	to	create	better	people	and	better	societies,	we	need	to	break	free	from	old	patterns.	This	requires	more	than	data	from	the	past.	It	requires	something	qualitatively	different.	It	requires	theory.	Theories	that	model	futures	that	have	never	been.	Now	these	theories	are	rooted	in	the	past,	but	project	a	future	that	is	significantly	different	from	it.	Serious	explorations	of	what	could	and	should	happen	“in	theory”	are	extremely	creative	acts.	Of	course,	we	have	to	remember	that	“all	models	are	wrong,	but	some	are	useful”	(Box	and	Draper,	1987).	This	applies	to	thoereticlly	derived	models,	or	simply	some	form	of	intuitive	‘Weltanschauung’.	So	there	will	always	be	many	models,	of	complementary	aspects	of	reality,	complementary	visions,	aimed	at	creating	different	aspects	of	better	futures.	So	since	no	model	will	ever	be	perfect,	there	is	a	lot	of	work	to.	This	is	good	news	for	the	sciences.	In	contrary	to	a	future	vision	where	the	scientific	process	has	been	automated	by	machine-	and	deep	learning	algorithms,	it	shows	that	there	will	be	a	great	demand	for	new	generations	of	visionaries	and	visionary	scientists	in	the	digital	age,	constantly	figuring	out	what	futures	we	would	like	to	live	in,	how	would	this	be	achievable,	and	how	would	be	get	there,	“in	theory”.		If	big	data	is	to	be	useful	for	political	sociology,	it	need	to	to	consider	that	human	history	is	not	automatically	stationary,	but	changing.	This	requires	to	go	beyond	the	traditional	data	paradigm	of	pure	data	analysis,	and	requires	the	creative	combination	of	both	theories	that	enable	to	forecast	and	project	unprecedented	scenarios,	and	(big)	data	to	calibrate	the	models	and	to	root	them	into	empirical	reality.		
Conclusion	So,	what	are	the	most	pressing	theoretical	issues	for	an	international	political	sociology	addressing	the	current	dynamics	of	datafication	of	governance?	How	can	we	productively	discuss	the	potentials	and	challenges	for	transnational	politics	in	a	time	where	its	knowledge-foundations	seem	to	be	shifting?		One	answer	suggested	by	this	paper	is	that	we	have	to	be	careful	to	resist	the	temptation	to	reduce	discussions	of	big	data	to	a	technical	issue	to	be	handled	by	computer	scientists.	Also,	we	need	to	refrain	from	treating	it	as	a	homogenous	phenomenon	with	a	set	of	identifiable	and	stable	features	that	will	produce	predictable	
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outcomes.	The	overall	theoretical	aim	of	this	paper	has	been	to	set	the	contours	of	a	research	agenda	that	can	stimulate	different	types	of	inquiry	into	the	relation	between	big	data	and	transnational	governance.		Our	discussions	of	the	intersection	of	datafication,	governance	and	politics	have	highlighted	the	need	to	revisit	widespread	assumptions	about	big	data,	knowledge	and	governance.	Rather	than	assume	that	data	‘speaks	for	itself’	or	is	the	same	thing	as	knowledge,	we	must	investigate	the	sorting	processes	and	analytical	operations	involved	in	the	production	of	knowledge	(Flyverbom	&	Madsen,	2015).	Also,	datafication	rests	on	and	facilitates	particular	forms	of	knowledge	and	rationalities,	and	these	in	turn	have	significant	consequences	for	what	we	see	and	act	on	because	they	guide	our	attention	in	subtle	ways.	Finally,	big	data	developments	have	important	but	somewhat	under-theorized	ramifications	for	temporalities,	anticipation,	and	path-dependency	that	ought	to	be	ecamined	by	sociologist	and	political	scientists	with	an	interest	in	this	emergent	phenomenon.	More	specifically,	we	have	argued	that	these	themes	can	productively	be	studied	by	looking	at	socio-technical	relations	in	three	decisive	moments	of	big	data	practices:	1st,	the	datafication	of	daily	life,	2nd,	the	the	production	of	patterns	and	predictions	and	3rd,	the	making	of	new	modes	of	governance.	We	take	such	relations	to	be	situated	and	we,	therefore,	treat	big	data	as	a	complex	phenomenon	that	obtains	different	shapes	in	different	contexts.		We	have	also	identified	four	sub-themes	that	researchers	could	pay	attention	to	when	studying	this	‘taking	shape’	in	specific	contexts	of	their	interest.	More	specifically,	we	argue	that	future	research	on	big	data	and	international	relations	could	productively	focus	on	a)	the	datafication-governance	nexus,	b)	the	enactment	of	political	subjects,	c)	valuation-dynamics	and	data-partnerships,	d)	the	role	of	theory	and	history	in	setting	limits	on	the	power	of	big	data		Each	of	these	sub-themes	has	been	extensively	discussed	above	and	table	1	in	the	beginning	of	the	paper	has	already	summarized	some	of	the	main	points	of	these	discussions.	It	is	our	belive	that	this	table	suggests	relavant	questions	and	theoretical	lineages	to	explore	when	studying	big	data	in	the	context	of	international	political	sociology.		
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